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Reputational leadership and preference similarity: Explaining organisational
collaboration in bank policy networks
SCOTT JAMES1 & DIMITRIS CHRISTOPOULOS2
1King’s College London, UK; 2MODUL University Vienna, Austria
Abstract. This article contributes to our understanding of the formation of policy networks. Research
suggests that organisations collaborate with those that are perceived to be influential in order to access
scarce political resources. Other studies show that organisations prefer to interact with those that share
core policy beliefs on the basis of trust. This article seeks to develop new analytical tools for testing these
alternative hypotheses.First, it measures whether perceptions of reputational leadership affect the likelihood
of an organisation being the target or instigator of collaboration with others. Second, it tests whether the
degree of preference similarity between two organisations makes them more or less likely to collaborate.
The article adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining exponential random graph models (ERGM)
with qualitative interviews, to analyse and explain organisational collaboration around United Kingdom
banking reform. It is found that reputational leadership and preference similarity exert a strong, positive and
complementary effect on network formation. In particular, leadership is significant whether this is measured
as an organisational attribute or as an individually held perception.Evidence is also found of closed or clique-
like network structures, and heterophily effects based on organisational type. These results offer significant
new insights into the formation of policy networks in the banking sector and the drivers of collaboration
between financial organisations.
Keywords: policy networks; collaboration; leadership; preference similarity; banking reform
Introduction
Organisations collaborate in the policy process in an effort to translate their goals into policy.
Network analysis has become a popularmethodological tool in political science formapping
and explaining the nature of organisational collaboration (for an overview of the literature,
see McClurg & Young 2011). From this perspective, networks are commonly viewed as
a conduit for the targeted exchange of information, such as legal, technical or political
knowledge.By exchanging information,organisations are able to inform others about policy
preferences, access their skills and expertise, and build alliances with supporters (Knoke
et al. 1996). Yet the benefits of collaboration must be weighed against the anticipated costs
of establishing organisational connections. Building relationships with others can be costly
in terms of the investment of time required or the potential loss of autonomy. As resources
are finite, organisations must therefore prioritise their efforts and make strategic decisions
about whom to work with. Studying the formation of policy networks therefore provides
valuable insights into how organisations’ use their relational environment to influence the
policy-making process.
Research suggests that organisations collaborate with those that are perceived to be
influential in order to access scarce political resources (Stokman&Zeggelink 1996;Stokman
& Berveling 1998; Leifeld & Schneider 2012). Other studies show that organisations prefer
to interact with those that share core policy beliefs on the basis of trust (Sabatier &
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Jenkins-Smith 1993;Weible & Sabatier 2005; Henry et al. 2011; Calanni et al. 2014). Recent
studies have integrated these competing theoretical approaches, allowing for the possibility
that resource dependency and preference similarity may provide complementary, rather
than contradictory, motives (e.g., see Henry 2011; Leifeld & Schneider 2012; Fischer &
Sciarini 2016; Ingold & Leifeld 2016).
We seek to add value to this literature through theoretical and methodological
refinement.This article develops two new analytical tools for testing hypotheses on resource
dependency and preference similarity. First, we design a new measure for organisational
leadership, as a sub-component of reputational influence, and test whether this attribute
increases the likelihood of an organisation being the target or instigator of collaboration.
Second, by recording organisational preferences on a single policy issue, we analyse
how the degree of preference similarity between two organisations affects patterns of
collaboration. In line with the results of recent studies, our findings suggest that motives
for collaboration are mixed: reputational leadership and preference similarity exert a
strong, positive and complementary effect on network formation. To be specific, perceived
leadership significantly increases the likelihood of an organisation being the target of
collaboration by others, whether leadership is measured as an organisational attribute or
as an individually held perception. In addition, the likelihood of collaboration between
organisations is significantly increased by the similarity of their policy preferences. We also
find evidence of closed or clique-like network structures, and heterophily effects based on
organisational type. These results contribute further to our understanding of organisational
motives for collaborating in the policy process.
We adopt a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative network analysis with
qualitative interviews to analyse and explain organisational collaboration around banking
reform in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2011. This expands the application
of network analysis in important ways. While existing studies have analysed sectors as
diverse as health policy, climate policy, regional planning and chemicals regulation (e.g.,
see Weible & Sabatier 2005; Henry 2011; Heaney 2014; Leifeld & Schneider 2012), to
our knowledge theories of network formation have not been applied to the banking
sector. Moreover, although financial regulation has become the focus for renewed research
on lobbying since the crisis, there has been little attempt to systematically map and
explain organisational collaboration between banks using formal network analysis (for an
exception, see Christopoulos & Quaglia 2009). The case of British banking has two critical
features which provide an empirical basis for predicting the dynamics of collaboration.
First, the banking sector in the United Kingdom is highly concentrated and competitive,
dominated by a handful of large global banks. On this basis, we would expect collaboration
to be relatively low, as financial firms are well-resourced,but also highly instrumental, driven
principally by perceptions of power and influence. Second, the nature of the policy issue –
bank structural reform – impacts differentially on bank business models: for some it is very
costly to implement, but for others it potentially provides a competitive advantage (James
2017). With these conflicts of interest, we expect limited scope for collaboration based on
shared beliefs and preferences. The study therefore provides a most-difficult case for testing
the robustness of theories of network formation in different policy subsystems.
The article begins by reviewing competing explanations of network formation, and then
outlines the research design and methods of data collection. In the analysis that follows, we
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model how well different hypothesised covariates (the independent variables) explain the
structure of the network (the dependent variable).The article concludes by reflecting on our
theoretical and methodological contribution to understanding organisational collaboration.
Theories of network formation
Policy networks refer to the relationships or ‘ties’ that form among individual or
organisational agents who attempt to influence policy outcomes. In recent years attention
has increasingly focused on explaining how and why network ties are formed and change
over time (Stokman & Zeggelink 1996; Hojnacki 1997; Henry 2011; Henry et al. 2011;
Leifeld&Schneider 2012;Fischer&Sciarini 2016; Ingold&Leifeld 2016).These approaches
place agency centre stage by viewing networks as the outcome of intentional choices
by strategic agents to collaborate. Network ties form when actors decide to exchange
information with others in an effort to bolster their influence in the policy process (Berardo
& Scholz 2010). Here network formation is explained as the result of particular attributes
of the organisations concerned, which make them more or less likely to establish ties with
one another. The aim is to explain network formation by measuring how well different
hypothesised dynamics explain the structural characteristics of a given network (Henry
2011: 364). To this end, dynamic network models apply theoretically significant meanings
about patterns of ties and then test these using a parametric statistical approach (Wasserman
& Faust 1994). We draw upon the two most commonly applied theoretical perspectives on
network formation: resource dependency and preference similarity. We briefly review each
below.
Resource dependency theory (RDT) assumes that actors are instrumentally rational
and power-driven. In a policy context, organisations aim to control scarce resources,
such as information, technology, personnel or political clout, through which to shape
policy outcomes (Hojnacki 1997). To maximise their access to these valuable resources,
organisations look to form ties with powerful others.Tominimise the search and transaction
costs of finding useful collaborators, organisations seek out partners who are perceived
to be influential as this is a signal that they are able to affect others’ behaviour through
the effective control of valuable political resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The theory
therefore assumes that the most important predictor of tie formation is reputational
influence.Evidence for these claims comes from studies which show that, once other factors
are held constant, influence attribution has a significant effect on patterns of alliance building
(Hojnacki 1997: 61), policy coordination and advice seeking (Weible & Sabatier 2005: 471).
Reputational influence is a multidimensional concept which incorporates agenda-setting
power, decision-making power and problem-solving power (Fischer & Sciarini 2015).
We seek to contribute to greater theoretical specificity by focusing on a particular sub-
component of reputational influence: reputational leadership. The concepts of ‘leadership’
and ‘entrepreneurship’ are well established in policy studies (seeMintrom&Norman 2009).
Policy leaders and entrepreneurs refer to exceptional agents that perform a particular role
or set of activities in the policy process (Arce 2001: 114; Ahlquist & Levi 2011). They
are viewed as possessing unique political skills and valuable resources, and demonstrate
a willingness to invest their time and energy in shaping the policy agenda in the pursuit of
particular policy goals (Christopoulos& Ingold 2015).To date, the application of the concept
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of ‘leadership’ to the policy network literature has been surprisingly limited (Huxham &
Vangen 2000: 1160). Existing research tends to conceptualise leadership as an individual
trait, and network analysis is used to explain the role or qualities of leaders in public
administration and local government (Wallis & Dollery 1997). For example, Berger (1997)
and Galaskiewicz and Shatin (1981) have assessed how those in political or public executive
positions form cooperative relationships with others. Other studies have explored the
relationship with collaboration – for example, leader-member exchange theory suggests that
leaders develop different types of dyadic relationships with different ‘members’ (Wayne
et al. 1997).Typically, however, leadership is treated as a dependent rather than independent
variable. We are also unaware of any attempt to systematically measure the concept of
‘organisational leadership’.
In this article, we assume that an organisation’s capacity for leadership exists ex ante
to the network ties that form spontaneously around specific policy issues. In other words,
organisations possess intrinsic qualities (such as valuable knowledge, technical expertise or
political skills) that shape their relational topology. In a context of imperfect knowledge
where organisations look to bolster their influence in the policy process by leveraging
their resources through others, reputational leadership serves as an important search
heuristic. Organisations will look to collaborate with those that they estimate have the
greatest capacity to take the initiative and shape the agenda. On this basis, we predict
that organisations perceived as leaders are more likely to be the target of collaboration
because other organisations will seek to access their scarce political resources. Conversely,
we would expect organisations with high reputational leadership to be less likely to instigate
collaboration. This is because their abundance of political resources means that they have
less need to seek to engage with other organisations.We test both of these hypotheses:
H1a: The higher the reputational leadership of an organisation, the more likely it is
to be the target of collaboration.
H1b: The higher the reputational leadership of an organisation, the less likely it is to
instigate collaboration.
Theories of preference similarity differ fundamentally from power-driven explanations
because they assume that organisations form ties with one another when they share core
policy beliefs (Stokman & Zeggelink 1996; Stokman & Berveling 1998). In policy studies,
this approach is most closely associated with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible & Sabatier 2005). It assumes that organisations
prefer to work with those that have the same policy preferences because this provides an
important signal that they can be trusted (Lubell 2007). Hence organisations in a policy
subsystem tend to group together into distinct coalitions based on their policy preferences
and engage in non-trivial coordination to influence government policy. These approaches
predict that the primary determinant of network structure is therefore preference similarity
(Weible & Sabatier 2005: 461; Henry 2011). The following hypothesis tests for belief-based
effects:
H2: The closer the policy preferences between two organisations, themore likely they
are to share a tie.
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To test these two theoretical perspectives,we refine existing analytical tools by designing
new variables of reputational influence and preference similarity. These are used to explain
patterns of organisational collaboration during the banking reform process in the United
Kingdom between 2010 and 2011. The next section provides a brief overview of our case
study.
The case: United Kingdom banking reform
Since the financial crisis, the United Kingdom has pursued an ambitious agenda on
banking reform.Following theMay 2010 election, the new coalition government established
an Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) to make recommendations that would
promote both stability and competition in banking. In response, the Commission enga-
ged actively with a wide range of representatives from industry trade associations,UK-based
banks, the business community and consumer groups.The issue which came to dominate the
banking reform process was ‘structural’ reform: the extent to which banks’ retail activities
should be structurally separated from its investment activities to prevent deposits frombeing
used for high-risk trading. Stakeholder engagement on the issue revealed highly divergent
views: some organisations lobbied aggressively for the preservation of the universal banking
model, while others called for a full split between retail and investment banking. The ICB’s
final report, which recommended that retail banks in the United Kingdom be placed in a
legally separate and operationally separable ‘ringfenced’ subsidiary, therefore represented
a compromise between these polarised positions (ICB 2011).
We use network analysis to map patterns of organisational collaboration around the
banking reform process by focusing specifically on the structural reform issue. Using bank
structural reform as a case study is valuable in several respects. Theoretically, the British
financial sector provides a particularly good example of an industry characterised by durable
and densely interconnected networks which are periodically activated around regulatory
issues. Methodologically, network analysis is highly resource-intensive as it requires the
surveying of a whole pre-defined network population (Wasserman & Faust 1994). This
explains why its use in capturing informal organisational ties in policy networks remains
comparatively rare. However, bank structural reform offers a sufficiently small network
of a few big players which can be measured using survey questionnaires. Social Network
Analysis (SNA) also tends to yield the best results when applied to detailed single case
studies because it affords greater analytical and contextual detail (Heaney 2014). Finally,
the study promises to yield new empirical insights on the hidden political ties that exist
across the City of London. These ties are commonly assumed to exist, but they have yet to
be mapped systematically.
Data and methods
Our research design employs a mixed-methods approach which triangulates data from four
sources: data on network relationships; attribute data collected via a survey questionnaire;
a survey of independent experts in the policy field; and in-depth interviews with key
organisational informants.This has a number of advantages.The collection of statistical data
on organisational ties and attributes enables us to model the policy network, test different
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd.on behalf ofEuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
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Table 1. Attribute data
Reputational
leadership
Policy
preference
Organisational
salience
Which? 3.39 (0.85) 4.50 (0.62) 3.00 (1.41)
Financial Services Consumer Panel 2.45 (0.93) 3.78 (0.83) 4.00 (0.82)
The Law Society 1.90 (0.99) 1.83 (0.75) 2.25 (0.50)
Deloitte 2.71 (1.07) 2.45 (0.82) 2.25 (0.50)
KPMG 2.31 (1.03) 2.60 (0.70) 2.25 (0.50)
Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2.50 (1.22) 2.67 (0.65) 2.25 (0.50)
Ernst and Young 2.25 (1.06) 2.60 (0.70) 2.25 (0.50)
Confederation of British Industry 2.33 (1.03) 1.83 (0.79) 3.00 (1.15)
British Chambers of Commerce 1.77 (0.93) 2.78 (1.09) 2.50 (0.58)
Federation of Small Businesses 2.09 (1.04) 3.67 (0.98) 2.75 (0.50)
The CityUK 1.89 (0.90) 1.58 (0.69) 5.00 (0)
British Bankers’ Association 2.30 (1.18) 1.38 (0.65) 5.00 (0)
AFME 2.12 (0.86) 1.44 (0.63) 4.75 (0.50)
Association of British Insurers 2.53 (1.06) 2.18 (0.87) 3.75 (0.50)
Investment Management Association 2.20 (0.92) 2.86 (0.90) 3.75 (0.50)
Building Societies Association 2.21 (0.80) 3.36 (0.92) 3.25 (0.50)
Barclays 3.23 (1.19) 1.14 (0.47) 5.00 (0)
HSBC 3.36 (1.18) 1.52 (0.51) 5.00 (0)
Lloyds 3.10 (1.09) 2.32 (1.04) 5.00 (0)
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.62 (1.12) 1.52 (0.68) 5.00 (0)
Santander UK 2.74 (0.99) 2.28 (1.07) 4.50 (0.58)
Standard Chartered 2.80 (1.06) 1.44 (0.63) 4.50 (0.58)
Nationwide 3.06 (1.00) 2.46 (1.20) 4.25 (0.50)
Notes: The scores for reputational leadership and policy preference are the mean of the scores assigned to
each organisation by all the organisational informants. Organisational salience is the mean of the scores
assigned to each organisation by the five independent coders. Values in parenthesis are standard deviations.
theories of network formation andmake generalisable claims about why some organisations
are better connected than others.Qualitative interviews provide supportive evidence for the
causal claims underpinning our quantitative analysis.
Network data
Data on the network population was generated using decisional, positional and reputational
approaches. Beginning with the decisional approach, we compiled a list of all 150 actors
that responded to the ICB’s call for evidence in 2011. Given that most of these were from
individual respondents, the list was subsequently narrowed down to the 30 most important
organisations (the positional approach). Following Knoke et al. (1996), the list was then
circulated to a cross-section of experts from the financial industry, regulatory authorities
and other stakeholders to validate its reliability (the reputational approach). This produced
a final list of 23 organisations (see Table 1). Since the network being modelled is directed
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and our unit of analysis are the ties that form between actors, this gives us potentially
n2 – n = 506 observations.
Key organisational informants were identified using public records, ICB submission
contact details and email enquiries. In the trade associations, we identified the key
individuals involved in the process, and in the large banks we contacted the designated ‘lead’
for banking reform in the regulation team.All these individuals were contacted and invited
to participate in an interview survey: in total, we interviewed 34 individuals from 22 of the
23 organisations on the list, giving a response rate of 96 per cent.
To elicit data on our dependent variable – network ties – participants were advised that
we were interested in identifying all those organisations that they collaborated with on
the issue of bank structural reform during the ICB process. We informed all interviewees
that in the survey we defined ‘information exchange’ specifically in terms of who they
‘sought to engage with for the purpose of collaboration’. From the list of 23 organisations,
participants were then asked to ‘indicate all those organisations with who you exchanged
information about the banking reform process’. The data yielded is therefore directional
in that it measures both incoming collaborative ties to, and outgoing collaborative ties
from, each organisation. This directional data allows us to test whether organisations with
particular attributes are more likely to be the target of collaboration (as measured by the
number of incoming ties) or are more likely to instigate collaboration (as measured by the
number of outgoing ties).
Attribute data
To gather data on organisational leadership,we look to refine existing reputational measures
of influence. In policy studies, the reputational measure is an important and widely used
method for assessing the power of political actors (e.g., Kilduff & Krackhardt 1994; Knoke
et al. 1996; Henry 2011; Matti & Sandström 2011; Ingold & Leifeld 2016). Reputational
data is typically generated by asking actors to name those that are influential with respect
to a specific policy issue; each attribution is then aggregated to provide an average
power score for each actor (Fischer & Sciarini 2015: 61). An important strength of the
measure is that it is peer-based, relying on those with an intimate knowledge of the
policy process and the other actors involved. However, the limitations of reputational
influence are also well documented. Attributions are inherently subjective because power
is multidimensional and it is difficult to control the criteria on which actors base their
evaluation. Reputational measures may also be biased as a result of deliberate self-
promotion or genuine misperception (Heaney 2014). Put differently, there is a risk that
reputational measures mis-specify the direction of causality: an actor may attribute power to
those to whom they are connected because they have more information about them and/or
to exaggerate their own reputation (Leifeld & Schneider 2012: 734).
To address these methodological challenges, we operationally defined ‘reputational
leadership’ as an organisation’s capacity to set the agenda by taking the initiative
and persuading others to endorse their position. This definition improves on existing
reputational measures because it is significantly narrower and arguably less normatively
loaded than conventional measures of reputational influence. It should therefore be less
prone to problems of bias arising from subjectivity. In the survey, participants were asked to
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indicate the strength of this attribute for each organisation on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = weak
attribute; 5 = strong attribute). Our approach improves on existing reputational variables
by using an ordinal scale, rather than relying on binary data based on simple influence
attributions, as it encourages respondents to think carefully about the relative power of
other organisations. To improve the reliability of the data with respect to causation, we also
used a temporal specification method designed to capture participants’ perception of an
organisation’s reputation for leadership at the start of the banking reform process (Matti &
Sandström 2011).
Reputational leadership is used in its aggregated form; a score is calculated for each
organisation based on the mean of the scores assigned to it by all the other organisations
(see Table 1). This data produced a node covariate (i.e., an attribute of an organisation) for
use in our statistical model. In theoretical terms, leadership as an attribute is a property of
an organisation based on the shared perception of everyone in the network. The model
therefore tests the effect of leadership on the probability of an organisation being the
instigator or target of collaboration (as measured by the number of incoming and outgoing
network ties). As an additional test of the importance of reputational leadership, we
also measured leadership as a dyadic covariate which captures how the leadership of
an organisation is perceived by another organisation. This was calculated by using the
leadership score as assigned by organisation A (ego) to organisation B (alter) for each
pair of organisations, producing a directed leadership matrix. We then tested whether this
individually held perception of leadership makes organisation A more likely to seek to
collaborate with organisation B (as measured by a directed tie from A to B).
Tests for preference similarity commonly rely on binary measures that simply record
whether an organisation is in agreement or disagreement with the policy preferences of
others in the network. But this distillation of beliefs into dichotomous pro/anti sentiments
risks over-simplifying complex issues characterised by important nuances (Mattli &
Sandstrom 2011: 389). To capture the degree of preference similarity between organisations,
we draw on recent studies which develop ordinal scales for measuring policy preferences
(e.g., see Henry 2011; Leifeld & Schneider 2012; Ingold & Fischer 2014). We are able
to do this for two reasons. First, the specific policy issue with which we are concerned
(bank ‘structural’ reform) is unidimensional – that is, organisational preferences can be
represented as points on a one-dimensional continuum. Second, organisations have single-
peaked preference functions – namely, each organisation has a single ideal position and
that positions away from this are preferred less. By using a more fine-grained measure of
preferences, the method provides for a more rigorous test of preference similarity.
To generate data on organisational preferences, informants were given the following
instruction1: ‘Please indicate the position of each organisation on structural reform at the
start of the banking reform process on a scale of 1 (supports the status quo) to 5 (supports
a full split between retail and investment banking).’ We measure preference similarity by
calculating the difference in preference scores between each pair of organisations in the
network. The resulting variables produce a matrix of preference similarities. This can be
interpreted as an undirected network and used as a dyadic covariate in the model.
It is important to acknowledge that hypotheses on network formation potentially suffer
from reverse causality (Leifeld & Schneider 2012: 740). To be precise, maintaining ties with
others may breed trust and lead actors to perceive one another as influential; it may also
C© 2017TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd.on behalf ofEuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
REPUTATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND PREFERENCE SIMILARITY 9
foster a shared understanding of policy problems.Thus, it is possible that network formation
may cause reputational leadership and preference similarity. We draw upon qualitative
interviews with organisational informants to provide supportive evidence for the direction
of causality suggested in our theoretical model.
We also control for other important variables which may impact on network formation.
The first concerns homophily effects based on organisational type. It is assumed that certain
organisations are more likely to collaborate with one another because they share key
attributes, such as the nature of their role or institutional form (see Lee et al. 2012; Gerber
et al. 2013; Heaney 2014). For example, we might expect trade associations to be highly
interconnected within policy networks because their role is to heighten awareness of policy
issues by communicating and alliance building with others (Leifeld & Schneider 2012: 734).
Similarly, banks may have a tendency to exchange political information as a consequence
of their shared experiences in the policy process. To control for these potential homophily
effects, a dummy variable was added to the model for banks (1), trade associations (2) and
other organisations (3).
We also control for the salience of the policy issue for each organisation, recognising
that issue context can be as important as organisational-level characteristics (Binderkrantz
et al. 2014: 888). Organisational salience relates to the motivation that an organisation has
to engage around a specific policy issue (see Klüver 2013; Binderkrantz et al. 2014). The
material impact of a policy issue varies widely between organisations, so they face different
incentives to try to influence policy makers. Those for whom a policy issue imposes high
potential costs/benefits have a greater incentive to engage in lobbying, whereas those facing
minimal costs/benefits have a low incentive (Knoke et al. 1996;Yackee &Yackee 2006).This
is distinct from reputational leadership which concerns a particular role or set of activities
that an organisation performs in the policy process, such as agenda-setting and persuading
others (Arce 2001: 114;Ahlquist & Levi 2011).Rather than being policy-specific, leadership
relies on a set of intrinsic qualities, such as technical expertise or political skills, a reputation
for which is accumulated over time (Christopoulos & Ingold 2015). These concepts need
not overlap: an issue can be highly salient to an organisation, but it may lack the qualities
necessary to exert leadership in the process; conversely, an issue may have little material
impact on an organisation, but it may choose to perform a leadership role as a matter of
principle.
Adapting the definition used by Knoke et al. (1996), we define ‘salience’ as ‘the
importance of banking reform to each organisation’. Including salience as a control variable
helps to improve the robustness of our results in two ways. First, salience potentially
provides an alternative explanation for organisational collaboration. In the absence of
knowledge about the reputational leadership of organisations around an issue, lobbyists
may use perceptions of salience as a heuristic short-cut to find prospective organisational
collaborators. Second, informants may have a tendency to over-estimate the importance of
other organisations for whom an issue is highly salient and/or exaggerate their connections
with them. It is therefore important to control for bias arising from potential misperception
or deliberate self-promotion (see Johnson & Orbach 2002). Following Yackee and Yackee
(2006: 132), five independent experts were asked to code each organisation for salience on
a five-point scale (1 = weak attribute, 5 = strong attribute), with the mean score used in the
model.2
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Exponential random graph models (ERGM)
Data on collaborative ties between organisations allow us to describe a policy network using
graphical tools. To explain its structure, we need to test whether the observed pattern of
organisational ties is purely random, or whether it exhibits regularities associated with the
effect of different hypothesised covariates. Because observations cannot be assumed to be
independent, standard statistical methods are inappropriate. Instead, we can use ERGMs
to specify complex interdependencies in a statistical model using both endogenous and
exogenous parameters (see Cranmer et al. 2016). These calculate the probability of an
observed network, given a set of statistics on the network, compared to all networks that
could have been observed (Lusher et al. 2013; see alsoWasserman&Robins 2005).ERGMs
are capable of modelling three types of network properties: node covariates (organisational
attributes, such as reputational leadership), dyadic covariates (attributes of ties, such as
preference similarity) and endogenous network structures (reciprocity, transitivity).Models
are estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods which generate a
sample from the space of all possible networks to estimate the parameters that maximise
model likelihood. The dependent variable is the log odds of establishing a network tie. The
estimated coefficients are therefore interpreted as log-odds ratios, conditional on the rest of
the network. In other words, when a parameter estimate is positive, the probability of a tie
between two actors is larger than the probability that they are not tied, conditional on all
other parameters in the model.3
ERGMs proceed in steps to model the network. They begin by calculating parameter
estimates for basic structural effects (models A and B). These capture important forms of
interaction which rely on the accumulation of trust, such as the tendency of organisations
to return ties in kind (reciprocity) and the existence of closed or clique-like structures
which rely on third party brokerage to facilitate ties (transitivity) (Wasserman & Faust
1994: 507). Next, we calculate parameter estimates for each covariate by adding them in
steps: reputational leadership, organisational salience, organisational type and preference
similarity (models C–E).Model F includes our alternative measure of leadership as a dyadic
covariate.TheERGMstatistically tests the relationship between each covariate and network
structure,while holding all the other parameters constant.As the network data is directional,
the model tests the effect of each attribute for both incoming and outgoing organisational
ties.Table 2 presents a summary of the results (seeOnlineAppendix 1 for the full estimation
results and goodness of fit (GOF) statistics).
ERGMs are interpreted using GOF statistics which compare the simulated graph of
the estimated model against the network that has been modelled. The GOF heuristics
(reported values for Mahalanobis distance in Table 2) indicate that all the models have
converged (models A–F), and are significantly improved by the addition of our fitted
parameters. To visualise the GOF, we use boxplot diagrams to plot four network statistics
from the original network (the thick black line) and 100 simulated networks (the box
plots) for minimum geodesic distance, in degree, out degree and edge-wise shared partners
(see Online Appendix 3) (Hunter et al. 2008a). Although the fit is moderate for the out
degree distribution, the model performs well at reproducing the distribution for the other
three statistics. This gives us confidence that our hypothesised covariates are relevant in the
explanation of tie formation in the observed network.
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Figure 1. The policy network on United Kingdom banking reform. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Notes: Network produced using Gephi visualisation software, with the Fruchterman Reingold layout
algorithm. Nodes coloured by organisational type and weighted by betweenness centrality (rescaled 6–
18 points).
Results and analysis
The policy network around British banking reform is presented in Figure 1.The data reveals
a densely connected pattern of organisational ties, characterised by a strong core-periphery
structure. The core of the network is composed of eight highly connected large banks
and financial trade associations, while other stakeholders (non-bank trade associations,
other banks, consumer groups and professional services firms) are less well connected.
Closer analysis reveals that there are significant differences in the relational profiles of the
banks: some stand out as highly central (HSBC, Lloyds, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland
[RBS] and Santander), while others have very few connections (Standard Chartered and
Nationwide). Notably, the main champions of consumer interests (Which? and the FSCP)
are among the most peripheral organisations in the network.
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The attribute data also highlight important patterns of divergence within the banking
reform network. Tellingly, the preference scores show that the main banks did not present a
unified bloc of interests (see Table 1).While themajority were broadly hostile to the reforms,
three important institutions (Lloyds,Santander andNationwide) supported the government
because they had little to lose from the changes.4 The banks also played distinct leadership
roles: while some were widely perceived to be key agenda-setters (HSBC and Barclays),
others were far less prominent in the process (RBS and Santander). Surprisingly, we also
find that while the main financial and business associations are hyper-connected within the
network, they scored modestly for reputational leadership.To explain this pattern of ties,we
test our theoretical hypotheses on network formation.
ERGM results
The estimated parameters reported in Table 2 provide information about the likelihood of
structural effects being observed in a given set of network data. Large parameter values
indicate that more configurations of that type are observed in the network than expected
randomly. Parameter estimates greater than twice the size of the estimated standard errors
are considered statistically significant.
The first results we report are the basic structural parameters in the network. The
models indicate reciprocity to be positive and significant – a result that remains robust
with the addition of the hypothesised covariates. The tendency for organisations to return
cooperation in kind indicates a high degree of institutionalisation and mutual trust. The
results for transitivity were mixed. Path closure (ATA-T), which captures the extent to
which organisations can facilitate collaboration and trust between two others,was significant
in model B; while popularity closure (ATA-D), which captures the extent to which two
organisations are likely to be connected if they have incoming ties from the same others,
was significant in models C and E. The results provide some evidence of closed or clique-
like interaction, although this is highly dependent on model specification.
With respect to our first control variable – organisational type homophily – we find
that the parameter is negative. The result is borderline significant in models D and E,
and significant in model F. This is evidence of a heterophily effect – namely, banks and
trade associations are less likely to form ties with other banks and trade associations. This
result is surprising because it contradicts previous research which finds evidence of actor
type homophily in collaboration networks (e.g., Lee et al 2012; Leifeld & Schneider 2012;
Gerber et al. 2013; Heaney 2014; Fischer & Sciarini 2016; Ingold & Leifeld 2016). We
offer two possible explanations. First, heterophily could result from the fact that certain
types of organisation may provide resources that are duplicative and therefore redundant.
Consequently, they are less likely to form collaborative ties with one another. Second, our
interviews suggest that other factors may also limit tie formation between these particular
organisations. For example, banks may be reluctant or unable to collaborate with other
banks on grounds of commercial sensitivity or due to legal restrictions (i.e., competition
rules). In addition, financial trade associations may have little incentive to work together
as many are effectively in competition with one another for members. Further research is
needed to investigate the potential that heterophily effects exist in certain policy sectors or
for particular types of organisation.
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Our second control variable – organisational salience – was found to be positively
associatedwith network tie formation.However, saliencewas only statistically significant for
incoming ties; in other words, the higher the salience of banking reform to an organisation,
the more likely they are to be the target of collaboration. Exponentiating the coefficients
in Table 2 provide an indication as to the size of the effect of each parameter, based on
the odds of a tie on the original network (Hunter et al. 2008a). Controlling for all other
factors, the effect of salience increases the odds of an incoming tie to an organisation by
142 per cent%.5 This confirms that tie formation is closely related to the perceived
importance of banking reform to each organisation. For the purposes of this study, including
organisational salience as a control variable allows for the more robust testing of our main
hypotheses.
Turning to RDT, the model shows that reputational leadership is positively associated
with the probability of an organisation attracting an incoming tie, and is statistically
significant when all other covariates are held constant. Interpreting the coefficient as a
conditional log-odds ratio, the effect of leadership increases the odds of an incoming tie to an
organisation by 98 per cent.6 The results therefore confirmH1a: the higher the reputational
leadership of an organisation, the more likely it is to be the target of collaboration. Further
corroboration comes from testing the importance of leadership as a dyadic covariate (i.e.,
organisation B’s leadership as perceived by organisation A), rather than as an attribute (the
shared perception of organisation B’s leadership). The estimation results, as reported in
model F, confirm that individually held perceptions of leadership also have a statistically
significant positive effect on tie formation. The finding is intriguing as it suggests that
collectively held and individually held perceptions of leadership exert a similar causal effect
on tie formation. Although further analysis of leadership as a dyadic covariate is needed,
these results provide further support for resource-driven explanations which assume that
organisations collaborate in order to access the scarce political resources held by others.7
The result for the relationship between reputational leadership and the outgoing ties of
an organisation is not statistically significant.H1b is therefore not confirmed. How can we
explain this? One possibility is that the effect of reputational leadership on tie formation
works in opposite directions. For example, as we hypothesised, organisational leaders may
have less incentive to instigate collaboration with others for the purpose of accessing their
resources. Equally, however, the act of exercising leadership in the policy process may
necessitate the instigation of collaborative ties in order to mobilise other organisations and
steer political action. If both dynamics are at work simultaneously then they will cancel each
other out, which may explain the insignificant result.8
The interviews support our theoretical assumptions about the direction of causality
specified in the model. In particular, they corroborate our claim that the desire to access
the resources of others provides a powerful driver for collaboration. As a bank lobbyist
explained, when a policy issue arises banks instinctively want to ‘represent themselves’ and
‘lead individually’.9 But if they lack political resources, they will look to collaborate with
others: ‘We go through a triage process and if we have limited resources and it’s material to
us … then we engage bilaterally.’10 When deciding whom to approach, organisations assess
the usefulness of others ‘on the basis of their potential to help set the agenda. …We would
then have initiated contact with them to have further discussions.’11 Another senior bank
official explained their motivation for collaboration:
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We contacted Standard Chartered because they had some strong views and were
influential in terms of thought leadership. … We were thrilled that they pitched in
because we weren’t in a position to make strong arguments. Similarly for HSBC.There
were points that [they] could make that would have been unseemly if made by us.12
Some banks stood out as leaders in the process and so were a popular target for
attempted collaboration. For instance, Barclays and HSBC were widely held to be ‘leading
the charge’ in threatening to leave the United Kingdom, ‘so they’re taken seriously and
listened to’.13 The reputation of both banks rested on their capacity to provide valuable
political resources.While Barclays’ leadership was symbolised by the high-profile and vocal
role of its CEOBobDiamond,HSBC’s reputation rested on its perceived potential to wield
influence. One bank lobbyist explained that they deliberately sought to reach out to HSBC
because they were ‘the most coherent at thinking about strategy. They have some quite
smart, thoughtful people in their global regulatory team and they engage around the world
with senior international regulators much more than we do.’14 Some banks also took the
initiative on specific issues, necessitating collaboration with others. Barclays, for example,
‘attempted to corral the other major banks to head off ringfencing by producing a credible
alternative’.15 Similarly, Lloyds took the lead in developing detailed proposals to enhance
competition in the sector ‘which meant galvanising the rest of industry … and exchanging
information’.16
By contrast, other banks were viewed as having less leadership potential. RBS, for
example,was the ‘public face of the crisis’ and the government bail-out had severely ‘clipped
its wings’, leaving themmore reliant on the trade associations tomake their case.17 Santander
was also slow to engage with the process and consequently fewer organisations attempted
to form ties with them, as a lobbyist explained: ‘The main reason was that they were still
relatively new to the market. … I don’t think it had a very proactive government relations
team. Its general attitude was just to keep your head below the parapet.’18 These examples
illustrate the importance of resource dependency as a driver of tie formation in the financial
industry.
Turning to belief-based explanations, the ERGM also provides important support for
the claim that network structure is positively associated with preference similarity and
is statistically significant (H2). In other words, the closer the policy preferences of two
organisations, the more likely they are to work together to influence policy makers;
conversely, the further apart the preferences of two organisations, the less likely they are to
be connected.The magnitude of the effect of preference similarity is more modest, however:
it increases the odds of two organisations sharing a tie by 37 per cent.19
The interviews provide several examples of the importance of non-instrumental drivers
of collaboration.For example,one bank deliberately shunned the opportunity to collaborate
with others because of their divergence of views: ‘We definitely did not discuss the detail of
our positioning and how we were approaching it with anybody. The reason was because
there were very different views between us and our main competitors.’20 Similarly, few
stakeholders reached out to the largest building society, Nationwide, despite it being
viewed as having an influential voice within government. This was because its support for
ringfencing meant that ‘it simply had a very different perspective’ on the banking reform
agenda.21
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Policy disagreements also hindered contacts between the financial industry and groups
representing small businesses and consumers. The small and medium enterprise (SME)
sector (represented by the British Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of Small
Businesses), as well as insurers and investors (the Association of British Insurers and the
Investment Management Association), were more distrustful of the banks and attached a
higher priority to maintaining economic stability at home.22 Consequently, the banks saw
little value in trying to build alliances with them, preferring instead to collaborate with like-
minded sections of the business community. The consumer groupWhich? also had a strong
reputation for agenda-setting given its high-profile role in convening its own commission on
banking regulation prior to the ICB process.23 Nonetheless, it was deliberately marginalised
because the banks perceived it as a cheerleader for breaking themup.As an industry lobbyist
commented: ‘I didn’t talk to them at the time because we just knew we wouldn’t agree.’24
This was corroborated by the group itself which reported that its engagement with industry
was ‘deliberately targeted’ at those with ‘similar views’ about the urgency of reform.25
Finally, the finding that the traditional financial associations were hyper-connected,
despite scoring modestly for leadership, helps to disprove the possibility of reverse causality.
If being highly central led to attributions of leadership,wewould expect that the associations
to score very highly for leadership on account of their longstanding collaborative ties across
the sector. On the contrary, the banks concluded early on that the main association, the
British Bankers’ Association (BBA), was ‘unhelpful’ and ‘ineffective’ because it was ‘not in
possession of the sort of data and analysis which was needed’.26 In addition, the association
had ‘zero credibility’ following a series of scandals, such as that involving the manipulation
of the London InterbankOffered Rate (Libor),with the result that ‘even if they’d wanted to
take a lead role, I think [the banks] would have pushed them aside’.27 Instead, the interviews
suggest that the main associations were nonetheless highly connected because of preference
similarity.TheBBA, for instance,adopted an uncompromising stance in defence of universal
banking and deliberately chose to represent the interests of the largest banks by ‘extracting
from them two, three, four key messages which we delivered’.28 Similarly, the main business
association, the Confederation of British Industry, became a popular target for tie formation
because it firmly allied itself with the large banks in criticising the detrimental impact of
ringfencing on the real economy.29 For example, one bank decided to work closely with
business groups because ‘we felt they’d be a more powerful force’ due to their ability to
‘represent what is in the best interests of British industry as a whole, not just a few banks’.30
The qualitative data provides strong support for our claim that reputational leadership
and preference similarity exert a consistently positive and significant effect on tie formation.
Furthermore, it points to the complementary and mutually reinforcing nature of these
two distinct drivers of organisational collaboration. The evidence we present suggests that
financial organisations were motivated to work with others because they provided access to
scarce political resources and as a result of sharing basic policy beliefs.
Conclusion
We conclude by reflecting on how to interpret the results presented in this article and how
these contribute to existing research. First, we find that the reputational leadership of an
organisation is consistently and strongly predictive of tie formation, when controlling for
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preference similarity, organisational type and salience. Our use of directional data and an
ordinal scale to capture leadership as an attribute permits greater theoretical precision. The
model tells us that leadership is only positive and significant for incoming ties, not outgoing
ties: in substantive terms, this means that organisations with a reputation for leadership are
more likely to be the target of collaboration (H1a). This is significant because it suggests
that organisations seek to leverage their influence by seeking to forge relationships with
those perceived to have an abundance of scarce political resources. Furthermore, the same
results appear to holdwhen leadership is used as a dyadic covariate – that is,organisationA’s
individually held perception of organisation B’s leadership. This provides powerful support
for the claim that resource dependency is a powerful motor of collaboration: organisations
seek to work with those most likely to provide the best access to scarce political resources
(Hojnacki 1997; Leifeld & Schneider 2012).
Second, we find that when controlling for all organisational attributes, preference
similarity is also an important determinant of tie formation (H2). This offers important
confirmation that organisations are more likely to collaborate if they share basic policy
beliefs (Calanni et al. 2014; Henry et al. 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). The
estimation results shed light on possible interaction effects between the covariates.Crucially,
the addition of preference similarity does not level out the effect of leadership or salience;
in fact, the coefficient for leadership actually increases slightly (model E). This tells us
that preference similarity complements the effect of reputational leadership in driving
tie formation, rather than competing with it, and therefore adds to our explanation of
organisational collaboration. Finally, we also find some evidence of transitivity effects
(path closure and popularity closure; models B, C and E), and – surprisingly – heterophily
effects based on organisational type (specifically, for banks and trade associations).
Although beyond the scope of this article, future research could systematically test for
the various interaction effects between these covariates – particularly, between leadership
and salience, leadership and preference similarity, and preference similarity and reciprocity/
transitivity.
Our results make an important contribution to ongoing research about whether power
or preferences drive network tie formation. In accordance with recent studies, we find that
reputational measures (in our case: leadership) and preference similarity both exert a strong
and robust influence on collaborative tie formation (Henry 2011; Leifeld & Schneider 2012;
Ingold & Leifeld 2016; Fischer & Sciarini 2016). In particular, our evidence supports the
conclusion of Fischer and Sciarini (2016) that they are distinct and complementary drivers
of tie formation. This finding differs to some extent from Leifeld and Schneider (2012),
who find that while reputational influence and preference similarity are significant, the
latter tends to be absorbed by the effect of common committee membership, reciprocity
and transitivity. Hence, they conclude that actors use institutional, social and relational
opportunity structures to establish contacts, rather than looking for those with similar
beliefs (Leifeld & Schneider 2012: 739; see also Lubell et al. 2002). We agree that
relational opportunity structures constitute an important driver of collaboration as ties
tend to be reciprocated, and find some evidence of closed or clique-like network structures.
Importantly, however, preference similarity appears to play a much greater role in driving
tie formation in our model because it remains significant when controlling for all other
parameters.
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Finally, this article makes a significant empirical contribution. To our knowledge,
theories of resource dependency and preference similarity have not been applied to
banking regulation before. Evidence that both theories hold explanatory value here
suggests that they are robust across highly diverse policy subsystems. The finding that
preference similarity serves as a significant driver of tie formation, even in the financial
sector, was surprising. Given that banks operate in a highly competitive environment, we
anticipated that collaboration would be largely strategic in nature. In addition, because
we were concerned with mapping policy networks, composed of ephemeral patterns of
collaboration around an atypical policy issue with characteristics of a one-shot game,
we did not expect belief-based motives to play such a central part in the story. Further
research would do well to compare the importance of reputational leadership and
preference similarity across ‘most different’ policy sectors (for a recent example, see
Ingold & Leifeld 2016). For example, it would be interesting to test the extent to which
differences in policy polarisation, policy issue salience or political contestation serve as
background conditions for organisational collaboration. It is conceivable that variance in
these factors may produce different results in the relative importance of leadership and
preferences.
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Notes
1. The question and scale were designed following preliminary interviews conducted with the banks and
regulators.
2. We identified and contacted five leading academic experts with an intimate knowledge of the policy
issue. The results were tested for inter-coder reliability, yielding an intraclass correlation coefficient
(ICC) of 0.753.
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3. We used the PNET software package to implement Monte Carlo Markov Chain simulations to
exponential random graphs (Wang et al. 2009) (see Online Appendix 1). As a further robustness
check, we also modelled the network in R using ergm (Hunter et al. 2008b) (see Online Appendix
2). This second model also converged with the same parameters being significant and with the same
signs.
4. Interview,May 2014.
5. This is calculated by raising the constant e to the power of the coefficient. For salience (incoming),
e0.8825 = 2.4169 or 142 per cent.
6. e0.6827 = 1.9792 or 98 per cent.
7. In an alternative model specification, we also tested whether reputational leadership was a clear or
noisy signal as perceived by other organisations. This was operationalised using the standard deviation
of each organisation’s mean leadership score, plus the interaction effect (mean x standard deviation)
(Table 1).The results were highly inconclusive (seeOnlineAppendix 4).The coefficients for the standard
deviation and interaction effect for leadership were found to be positive and significant for incoming
ties. However, this is somewhat counter-intuitive as it suggests that organisations are more likely to
seek to collaborate with those whose reputational leadership is ‘noisy’. The goodness of fit statistic for
the two models containing the standard deviation (models A and C) indicates that it is a relatively poor
fit,which leads us to be highly cautious in interpreting the result.We recommend that further theoretical
and empirical refinement is needed to test this hypothesis.
8. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this explanation.
9. Interview, September 2013.
10. Interview, November 2013.
11. Interview, June 2013.
12. Interview, October 2013.
13. Interview, August 2013.
14. Interview, October 2013.
15. Interview, October 2013.
16. Interview,May 2014.
17. Interviews,March 2013 and August 2013.
18. Interview, October 2013.
19. e0.3163 = 1.3720 or 37 per cent. Although this points to leadership as exerting a greater effect on tie
formation than preference similarity, we interpret these figures with some caution as the parameters are
highly sensitive to model specification. In addition, as our hypothesised covariates are ordinal variables,
the exponentiated coefficients do not allow us to specify the increase in log odds of a tie for each unit
increase in the parameter.
20. Interview, September 2013.
21. Interview, August 2013.
22. Interview, July 2014.
23. Interview, August 2013.
24. Interviews, July 2013 and June 2014.
25. Interview, June 2014.
26. Interviews, June 2013, September 2013 and October 2013.
27. Interview, October 2013.
28. Interview, June 2013.
29. Interviews, July 2013 and October 2013.
30. Interview, September 2013.
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